Q2.
[If draft=control There have recently been several stories in the news about the U.S. armed forces. Have you heard about these stories? 1. Yes 2.No Q2. [If draft=treatment] There have recently been several stories in the news about the U.S. armed forces. Our armed forces are currently composed entirely of volunteers, where only those who agree to serve join the military and face combat. After the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, some leaders argue that we should change this system and re-introduce a draft so that all American citizens would be eligible to serve in the armed forces. Congressional leaders think this is highly likely to happen before the next war. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors. This would occur prior to American involvement in a future international conflict. Have you heard about these stories? 1. Yes 2.No Q3. A country is threatening to invade its neighbor. The threatened nation has asked the U.S. to send troops to help their military. The U.S. President is considering sending the United States military to help the country that was attacked. [Foreign policy experts agree that there is a low risk of significant U.S. casualties, as the U.S. forces would easily overwhelm the opposition./ Foreign policy experts agree that there is a high risk of significant U.S. casualties, as the opposing forces are quite strong.]
[If draft=control:] Should the U.S. send the American military to fight and protect the threatened country? [If draft=treatment:] Should the U.S. send the American military to fight and protect the threatened country if a draft were reintroduced before the war? The military that goes to war would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.
1. Definitively should send troops 2 Should send troops 3. Should not send troops 4. Definitely should not send troops Q4. What is the probability that the United States will reintroduce a draft system for military recruiting? 1. Very unlikely 2. Somewhat unlikely 3. Neither likely nor unlikely 4. Somewhat likely 5. Very likely
G ender and the D raft
In our experiments, we did not exclude women from the draft. We presented a gender-neutral draft prompt for three main reasons. First, this mirrors the 2006 Charlie Rangel proposal to reinstate the draft that received the most media coverage on this issue (Heilprin 2006) . Second, the range of recent articles about the increasing prominence of women in the military, including a special series in the New York Times, suggests there is no reason to presume people would assume their exclusion if another draft occurred (Meyers 2009; Alvarez 2009 ). Third, the trend of recent events in the United States, including the decision to lift the ban on women serving in submarines, is in favor of more integration (Associated Press 2010) . Thus, we believe it is probably most straightforward to frame the treatment in terms of all citizens being eligible, so we wrote our draft prompt accordingly.
Supplemental E xperiments, C asualties F actor
In what follows, we describe the results of a series of additional experiments to test the robustness and validity of our results. First, we detail a series of experiments that vary the wording of the casualties factor. We then discuss a series of experiments that more closely mirror discuss the potential for interactions between some of the variables in our main experiment, especially hawkishness and whether or not respondents have children. For specific details on these supplemental surveys, please see below.
C asualties and Success
In our casualties manipulation, rather than just stating that experts expected casualties to be high or low, we gave a justification of those expectations to the respondents (either that casualty risks the expectations about casualties, but also about the likelihood of success (thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility to us). This could potentially skew our results for two reasons: (1) the conflation of success and casualties might influence how subjects evaluated the importance of conscription (based on hypothesis 2), or (2) by conflating success and casualties, we might have over-estimated the effects of casualties on support for sending troops (even if there is no effect on conscription). To address this concern, we ran another version of our experiment where we gave randomly assigned subjects to see one of four versions of our casualties manipulation: the casualties factor as given in the initial experiments, or a version which simply gives the expectations about casualty levels, without any arguments about the likelihood of success; subjects were also independently randomized into the treatment and control conditions on the draft factor as well. This allows us to examine whether subjects are really responding to our claims about casualty levels, or rather simply to perceptions of the likelihood of success.
We gathered the data for this additional experiment (and the ones that follow) from onTurk service), so the data do not in any way constitute a random sample of the U.S. population. Given this, these results lack straightforward ecological validity (i.e., they do not generalize to the broader U.S. population).
That said, a convenience sample can still help us ensure that our particular wording did not skew our results. Obviously random samples of the U.S. population would be ideal, but lacking them is not a particular impediment in this case.
One concern with on-line convenience samples is that subjects may simply satisfice, completing the survey as quickly as possible to receive their small monetary reward (subjects were paid between $0.50 and $1.50 for completing each experiment). While satisficing is always a concern with any sort of survey data (Krosnick 1999) , it is a particular concern with online subjects, who cannot be monitored by an interviewer or experimenter (as they could be with a phone survey or laboratory experiment). To ensure that subjects are actually attending to our ex instrument.
1 Such items are commonly used by psychologists collecting this sort of data (Oppenheimer et al. 2009) , and have been used by other political scientists gathering similar sorts of data as well (Kriner and Shen 2010) . Using this, we find that approximately 80 percent of our subjects are paying attention (that is, approximately 80 percent of the subjects successfully complete the task). 2 In the results we report below, we include all subjects (including those who fail the attention task) because we want to report conservative estimates (and including these respondents is equivalent to including random noise into our measure). We have also estimated our results on only the attentive sample, and the results do not change. when it is not, and that difference is not statistically significant, p=0.96). In the low expected casualty condition, there is a difference: 42 percent support sending troops when the success language is not included, but that figure rises to 53 percent when it is, but it fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.21). 4 What does this imply for our results? It suggests that the phrasing of the casualties item might lead us to slightly over-estimate the effect of casualties on support for the war (given that support in the low casualties condition is higher when the success language is included, thereby increasing the difference between the high and low casualties condition). 5 That said, however, given that the difference is not statistically significant, however, the effect is likely to be quite modest. Further, this does not affect our main substantive finding about the effect of the draft, so the consequences for our substantive conclusions are minimal.
C asualties and Risk A cceptance
One further concern with the wording of our casualties factor is that we have a high or low risk low casualties. Given this -averse subjects are especially sensitive to the wording of our original experiment. 6 To test this, we conducted another supplemental experiment, where we varied the wording of the casualties factor, giving some subjects the original wording, and other subjects a wording that indicated foreign policy experts expected high or low casualties (again, see below for the specific question wording). Table 3 gives the results.
[Insert table 3 about here] Table 3 shows that adding this language has no effect: the factor measuring the effect of the prospect theory language is statistically insignificant. But perhaps there is simply an interactive effect: the prospect theory language might matter only in the high casualties case. The data is not consistent with this hypothesis either (see model 2). 7 It appears here that this particular aspect of 5 One additional concern is that the success language might interact with either another experimental factor (such as the draft) or with other control variables (such as prior military service). We checked these possibilities and found no interactive effects. 6 We thank Adam Berinsky for making this point to us. 7 The raw levels of support are: all-volunteer force with low casualties and original language: 56%; all-volunteer force with low casualties and new language: 68%; all-volunteer force with high casualties and original language: 37%; all-volunteer force with high casualties and new language: 29%; draft force with low casualties and original language: 31%; draft force with low casualties and new language: 43%; draft force with high casualties and original language: 16%; draft force with high casualties and new language: 19%.
the wording did not really influence our results. One limitation of this setup, however, is that given the nature of these experiments, risk acceptance factors in to both sets of experiments: they are implicitly about future settings. That said, however, it is unclear how to test this sort of hypothesis in another setting, so we leave that for future work.
Another concern with the experimental approach used in the paper is that our scenario is very zed notion of the relationship between conscription and public support for the use of force. It does not name or provide any information about the countries involved in the dispute. As we explained in the paper, establishing the baseline effect of the draft on support for conflict without these complicating factors is necessary before we can understand specific scenarios in context (for more discussion of this point, see Hermann et al. 1999) . That said, however, one concern is that our results might look different if we used specific nations, or varied the primary policy objective All experiments follow the same basic format as described in the body of the paper (i.e.,
all three experiments randomly assigned subjects to the draft or all-volunteer military conditions, and experiments 1 and 2 also randomly varied the level of expected casualties). At the outset, we stress that the goal of every one of these experiments was to determine if our conclusions about the draft survive in a variety of different real-world scenarios. That said, however, we also test a number of more specific hypotheses in each scenario, which we describe below. 8 The experiments we conducted were:
Varying the Target Nation: experiment 1 asks respondents whether we should send troops if
China threatens to invade either Taiwan (a U.S. ally), or Cambodia (a nation with few political, economic, and military ties to the U.S.). 9 Here, we keep the PPO fixed (foreign policy restraint), but we vary the target nation (Taiwan or Cambodia) and the expected level of troops.
The PPO-Casualty Interaction: experiment 2 asks respondents whether we should send troops For details on the sample size, field dates, etc., please see below. 9 We acknowledge that Taiwan is not a U.S. treaty ally by law; we use the word ally here in the more informal sense of the word. We borrow this experimental setup from Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999).
10 upon how it is framed, it could also be seen as a humanitarian intervention scenario. Taken together, these experiments allow us to examine support for war in a serie scenarios. As in the experiment on casualties discussed above, these are fielded using online convenience samples. Again, while these samples may not generalize to the broader population in any simple fashion, they are still extremely useful because they help us to determine if our results about the draft replicate across different contextual settings. If the results from these real world scenarios are consistent with the more generalized survey results described in the text of the paper, it demonstrates the robustness of our results.
China and Foreign Policy Restraint
We begin by analyzing experiment 1. As in the main body of the paper, we analyze support for sending troops (1=support sending, 0=oppose sending) as a function of the draft factor (where subjects are told the troops will be from a draft military vs. not), the level of expected casualties (high/low expected casualties), and the target nation (Taiwan or Cambodia). Model 1 in table 4 gives the basic results; those interested in the raw level of support by condition (for all of these supplemental experiments) should see table 5.
[Insert tables 4 and 5 about here]
In this scenario as in the scenarios discussed in the paper the draft and expected casualties have large effects, with subjects more opposed to sending troops both when there is a draft or when casualties are expected to be high. Since our key finding is the link between the draft and public support, this is reassuring. In this case, however, there is also a large effect of the target state subjects are much more willing to send troops when China threatens Taiwan than when it threatens Cambodia. The effect size here is nearly as large as the effect of the draft: just using the raw data, introducing the draft lowers support for troop deployment by 19%, but changing the target from Taiwan to Cambodia lowers support by 17%. Unsurprisingly, subjects are more where the United States has considerable ties, rather than Cambodia (where the United States has interests when making foreign policy decisions (Hermann et al. 1999; Tomz 2007) .
Further, the effect of the target nation (Taiwan/Cambodia) may not simply be additive, but rather interactive. That is, whether China is attacking Taiwan or Cambodia may also condition the effect of the draft manipulation: the negative effect of the draft may be larger when Taiwan is the target, because subjects are hesitant to send any troops even volunteer forces to defend Cambodia. Model 2 in table 4 tests this hypothesis and the results demonstrate strong evidence of an interactive effect. Interestingly, the main effect of the draft becomes insignificant, which implies that when Cambodia is the target, the draft does not affect support for sending troops. Subjects are always opposed to sending troops to Cambodia, even when those troops volunteered for military service. These results verify what we argue in the conclusion of the paper: reinstating the draft might not significantly change support for a war in cases where there are floor or ceiling effects (i.e., wars that are so popular that subjects are willing to fight them with a draft, or wars that are so unpopular that subjects will not send even volunteer troops). This scenario seems to fit that particular bill.
Further, beyond these experimental factors, we also suspect that attitudes toward China itself (whether the respondent perceives China to be a threat to the U.S.) will also affect threat will be more likely to support deploying troops, regardless of other factors. Model 3 in table 4 tests this hypothesis. As we suspected, subjects who think China is a threat to the U.S. are more likely to support sending troops, all other things being equal. 11 Thus, scenario experiment 1 verifies the results in our paper by showing that, even in a condition where the public might have some interest in deploying troops abroad (defending Taiwan), reinstating the draft strongly decreases public support. However, the experiment also provides evidence that the scenario also matters and shapes the way the public will react to conscription.
Iran, PPOs, and Casualties
Scenario experiment 2 asks if our findings about the draft survive when we consider different
PPOs. In particular, we consider the two PPOs originally proposed in Jentleson (1992): foreign policy restraint (a threatened Iranian invasion of Saudi Arabia) and internal political change (a collapse of the Iranian regime in the wake of continued protests by the Green Movement). Given s, we expect more support for the foreign policy restraint scenario than the internal political change scenario. We are less certain, however, about how the PPO will interact with the draft to shape support for troop deployments. It may be that the effect of the draft overwhelms the effect of the PPO: the draft makes both PPOs so unpopular that it 11 for the draft). We found no evidence of interactive effects here, though see below on these interactive effects in the case of Iran.
swamps the variation induced by the mission. Alternatively, it may simply be that the draft and the PPO effect simply operate in an additive fashion, with both simply decreasing support for war with little interactive effect. support sending troops, respectively. This suggests that, in this particular scenario, the differences in support between PPOs hinge on having an all-volunteer force. Subjects presented with a draft military become so unlikely to support deploying US troops that the difference between PPOs disappears. Put slightly differently, the draft effect overwhelms the PPO effect:
the key factor here is that we introduce the draft, not that we vary the reason for sending troops in 12
As in the China experiment above, we hypothesize that whether or not a respondent perceives that Iran is a threat to the United States will also influence their willingness to send 12 sensitive to expected casualty levels in the internal political change scenario than they are in the foreign policy restraint scenario). We tested this hypothesis and found no support in our data.
troops, with subjects who perceive Iran is more of a threat being more willing to send troops.
Model 3 in Note that this finding contrasts with the earlier China scenario, where we found no interactive effects. We leave explore this between-nation difference for future work, and for now simply note that in some cases, threat perceptions condition the size of the draft effect. So this second scenario experiment provides further evidence supporting the core claim in the paper about the way reinstating the draft would decrease public support for going to war in a variety of conditions. As with the China experiment, however, the results also show that the specific scenario does matter as well, meaning the size of the draft effect depends somewhat on the specific conflict in question (though the draft decreases support for war in all scenarios). sensitivity, we focus here on how the draft will interact with these various PPOs. Given the salience of the war on terrorism, we hypothesize that the mass public would be willing to send draft or volunteer forces to destroy Al Qaeda training camps (i.e., the draft will have a smaller effect in the war on terror scenario than in the other scenarios). Further, given the findings in scenario experiment 2 above (the Iran scenarios), we also suspect that the internal political change scenario will be especially unpopular in both the draft and conscription conditions. Table   7 gives the basic results.
Yemen and PPOs
[Insert table 7 about here]
Column 1 in table 7 shows that in the basic additive model, the draft has a large effect, but there are very few differences across PPOs (here, the PPOs are measured as offsets relative to the baseline category, the foreign policy restraint scenario). The internal political change scenario is the only one that achieves statistical significance at conventional levels, and it is markedly less popular than the foreign policy restraint scenario (as prior work suggests). We would note, however, that the war on terrorism scenario is marginally statistically significant (p=.09, onetailed) and positive, which does suggest somewhat greater support for war on terrorism missions (though future work will be needed to determine the robustness of this particular finding).
Overall, however, the general pattern is really a lack of sharp differences across the various PPOs. As with our other scenario experiments, the draft exercises a significant and negative effect on public support. This further suggests that our findings are not just artifacts of the generalized hypothetical we presented in the paper, but a more robust result. with the Cambodia specification in the China scenario, this finding is probably due to the relative unpopularity of deploying troops even in the all-volunteer forces condition (support in this PPO is 35 percent in the all-volunteer condition, falling to 18 percent in the draft condition). These findings underline the central conclusion of our paper: subjects are always sensitive to the reintroduction of a draft, regardless of the nature of the mission or the nations involved; the only exceptions are extraordinarily popular/unpopular missions (i.e., floor and ceiling effects).
Conclusions looking across these three scenarios
Looking across all three different scenarios, two important conclusions emerge. First, and most importantly, these more realistic scenarios show strong support for our main argument: the draft has a large negative and statistically significant effect on the willingness of subjects to send he other aspects of the mission. Regardless of the nation involved, or the specific PPO, our finding about the draft is robust. This suggests that our findings are not limited to only a baseline hypothetical scenario, but instead replicate quite broadly across different kinds of real-world settings.
Second, the specifics of the scenario matter. This might seem trite, but it means that, in addition to establishing a baseline for public support for war under a draft, it is important to consider the consequences of specific scenarios. Our results show that the draft always matters, tolerance might change depending upon the specifics of the conflict and the PPO of the mission.
Further, attitudes toward the particular nations involved (especially the extent to which those nations are seen as a threat) also matter a great deal. Therefore, scholars looking to consider how deploy troops should not only consider our general findings, but also the specific details of the scenario of interest.
H awkishness as a Moderator of E xperimental F actors
In the models estimated in the body of the paper, we include hawkishness as a control variable predicting support for troop deployment (to test the hypothesis that more hawkish respondents also moderates the effect of either the draft or casualty sensitivity (i.e., that there is an interactive effect of the draft). To explore this possibility, we have estimated a further series of models where we explore how hawkishness might moderate the effect of our experimental factors. In particular, we focused on three situations: (1) the possibility that hawkish respondents with children might be less sensitive to the draft (i.e., a hawk x draft x have children interaction), (2) that young hawkish respondents might be less sensitive to the draft (draft x young x hawk interaction), and (3) hawkish respondents with children might be less casualty sensitive (hawk x children x casualty interaction). In all three cases, there are no significant three-way interactive effects. Indeed, there are only two significant interactive effectives in table 8. First, we replicate the effect from the body of the paper showing that young people are especially sensitive to the effect of the draft (i.e., the interaction between young and draft is negative and statistically significant). Second, we find an odd interaction between having children and casualty sensitivity, such that parents are more h. We have no principled explanation for this finding, and leave it to future work to explain this anomaly. One possibility not explored in table 8 is that three-way interactions might mask significant two-way interactive effects between hawkishness and the draft. Table 9 explores this possibility.
[Insert The results in table 9 show that hawks are no less sensitive to the draft, but there is an interactive effect on casualty sensitivity. Interestingly, hawks become less supportive when casualties are expected to be high. Put slightly differently, even hawks are casualty sensitive, and they too respond by being less enthusiastic for war when many Americans are expected to die.
In short, the findings in tables 8 and 9 suggest that hawkishness has only a weak moderating effect on our experimental manipulations (though a strong effect on overall support for war). That said, hawkishness may matter in ways we cannot test in our data. For example, a different manipulation might more directly prime hawkish attitudes, though we leave these sorts of tasks for future work.
Items Used in the Supplemental E xperiments
Casualties and Success Items N=249 subjects participated in this study fielded 21-22 April 2010. For all supplemental surveys, all subjects are a nonservice. Subjects were asked the same items as in the original survey; we do not repeat those items here to save space (see above the specific wordings). The new item to test the casualties/success linkage is:
A country is threatening to invade its neighbor. The threatened nation has asked the U.S. to send troops to help their military. The U.S. President is considering sending the United States military to help the country that was attacked. [Foreign policy experts agree that there is a low risk of significant U.S. casualties./ Foreign policy experts agree that there is a low risk of significant U.S. casualties, as the U.S. forces would easily overwhelm the opposition./ Foreign policy experts agree that there is a high risk of significant U.S. casualties./ Foreign policy experts agree that there is a high risk of significant U.S. casualties, as the opposing forces are quite strong.]
Should the U.S. send the American military to fight and protect the threatened country?
[If draft=treatment:] The military that goes to war would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.
Casualties and Risk Acceptance N=268 subjects participated in this study, fielded 10-11 August 2010. Subjects were asked the same items as in the original survey, with one exception:
A country is threatening to invade its neighbor. The threatened nation has asked the U.S. to send troops to help their military. The U.S. President is considering sending the United States military to help the country that was attacked. [Foreign policy experts predict that the conflict will produce only a small number of U.S. casualties, as U.S. forces should easily overwhelm the opposition. / Foreign policy experts agree that there is a low risk of significant U.S. casualties, as the U.S. forces would easily overwhelm the opposition./Foreign policy experts predict the conflict will produce a high number of U.S. casualties, as the opposing forces are quite strong. / Foreign policy experts agree that there is a high risk of significant U.S. casualties, as the opposing forces are quite strong.]
China Survey Experiment
N=248 subjects participated in this experiment, fielded 27-28 April 2010. Subjects were asked the same items as in the original survey, with two exceptions:
Now we'd like to get your opinion about situations that some people think are threats to the United States. For each of the following issues, please tell us if you consider it to be an extremely serious threat, a very serious threat, a somewhat serious threat, not too serious a threat, or not at all a serious threat to the United States.
Imagine that China has recently begun massing troops on its border and is threatening to attack and invade [Taiwan, a U.S. ally/ Cambodia, a Southeast Asian nation with few political and financial ties to the U.S.]. $NATION 13 has asked the U.S. to deploy U.S. forces to help the $NATION military. The U.S. President is considering allowing U.S. troops to help defend $NATION if it is attacked. [Foreign policy experts anticipate that the conflict will produce a large number of U.S. casualties, as the Chinese forces are quite strong./ Foreign policy experts anticipate that the conflict will produce only a small number of U.S. casualties, as the Chinese forces will back down shortly after U.S. forces begin engaging them.] Should the U.S. send the American military to fight and protect $NATION?
[If draft=Treatment] The military that goes to war would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors.
Iran Survey Experiment N=250 subjects participated in this experiment, fielded 27-29 April 2010.
Foreign Policy Restraint Scenario:
Imagine that Iran has recently begun massing troops and is threatening to attack and invade Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has asked the U.S. to deploy U.S. forces to help them. The U.S. President is considering allowing U.S. troops to help defend Saudi Arabia if it is attacked. Foreign policy experts anticipate that the conflict will [only produce a small/produce a large] number of U.S. casualties. Should the U.S. send the American military to fight and protect Saudi Arabia?
Internal Political Change scenario: Imagine that continuing protests by the Green Movement in Iran have led to massive internal instability and the regime is toppling. A humanitarian disaster has erupted with reports of killings and starvation throughout the country. The United States is considering intervening to help restore order and provide support to the civilian population. Foreign policy experts anticipate that the mission will [only produce a small/produce a large] number of U.S. casualties. Should the U.S. send the American military to help stabilize Iran? [If draft=Treatment:] The military that goes to Iran would be a draft military. All American citizens between the ages of 18-40 would be eligible for conscription into the military on a random basis, with no deferments except for religious conscientious objectors. Note: cell entries are probit regression coefficients, with associated standard errors underneath. Coefficients that can be distinguished from 0 at conventional levels of statistical significance are given in bold.
Yemen Experiment

